Compatiblism vs. Incompatiblism - Frankfurt Cases

The Consequence Argument by Peter Van Inwagen, also known as the incompatibilist argument, argues that determinism and free will are incompatible, meaning that they cannot co-exist. Determinism is the idea that all events are decided by prior events and the laws of nature. The argument against the Consequence Argument is called the compatibilist argument, which states that it is possible for determinism and free will to co-exist, though they don’t have to. Learning if people have free will regarding their actions helps us determine if we can hold people truly responsible for the things they say or do. If someone has control over his actions, then he has free will, meaning that he meant what he did. For example, if a customer in a store accidentally pays extra, and if the employee gives the extra money back with his own free will, then we can say that the employee is a good person and deserves to be rewarded. If the employee lets the customer leave and keeps the extra money, again, with his own free will, then he is a bad person and can be blamed. Holding people accountable for their actions is important because it provides justice and fairness for those who have been wronged. Thus, we can give people the correct and fair consequence for their actions. 

The Consequence Argument essentially says that if determinism is true, then, since we can’t change or alter the past or the laws of nature, then we can’t change our present actions. According to this argument, if everything is determined before, then there is no way free will exists. This incompatibilist argument is often supported by the Principle of Alternate Possibilities, which essentially states that if a person has a choice, then he can pick the option that he desires, but he is also able to do something other than what he chose to do, which essentially states that he has free will. However, if determinism exists, then it means that someone’s decisions were already determined beforehand. Therefore, this argument eliminates the idea that there is another option apart from the determined choice, and completely gets rid of free will. As a product, the Principle of Alternate Possibilities acts as a counter argument for compatibilism. 

This argument is parallel to another argument that is debated in religion. In Christianity, people believe that God is omniscient. This means that God knows everything, so He knows what action someone will perform before they perform it at all. Therefore, since one cannot change God’s knowledge, this parallel argument reinforces the idea that the outcome of someone’s action is already determined. If God already knows what action someone is going to perform, then does that person really have free will? This argument demonstrates that with the Principle of Alternative Possibilities, free will and determinism cannot coexist. 

  The Principle of Alternative Possibilities suggests that a person is morally responsible for what they have done only if they could have done otherwise. However, this principle can be challenged by certain counterexamples, like the well-known Frankfurt cases. Frankfurt presented hypothetical scenarios that question the necessity of alternative possibilities for moral responsibility. One case involves two individuals, Black and Jones. In this scenario, Black wants Jones to perform a specific action and is committed to ensuring that Jones does so, no matter what. Black is even willing to intervene and force Jones to perform the action if Jones chooses not to. Despite this, Jones goes ahead and performs the action on his own, without any interference or coercion from Black. From Jones’s perspective, he acts freely and willingly, unaware that Black would have intervened had he chosen otherwise. This scenario shows that while Jones seemingly made a free choice, in reality, he never truly had the option to refrain from performing the action. Even though Jones lacks alternative possibilities—because Black would have compelled him to act if necessary—he still acts of his own accord. This and many other scenarios in the Frankfurt cases disprove the Principle of Alternative Possibilities. If Jones can still be said to act freely, despite not having an actual alternative course of action, then Principle of Alternative Possibilities does not hold in all cases. The Frankfurt example demonstrates that moral responsibility does not need the ability to do otherwise. In this way, the Frankfurt cases serve as a counterexample to the Principle of Alternative Possibilities and weaken one of the key arguments in favor of incompatibilism. 

However, an incompatibilist can go against this argument. If we are comparing this case to the Principle of Alternative Possibilities, then Black would be playing the role of determinism, which is the laws of nature and past events. Suppose the action that was going to occur was Jones shooting another person, and suppose that at the end, Jones decides against performing the action. Then, there may be a case where Black would forcibly make Jones shoot the person by grabbing Jones’s hand, placing his finger over Jones’s, and squeezing the trigger together. In this scenario, Jones did not have the option of not shooting the person. However, an incompatiblist may say that Jones did not really commit the action, since he was merely acting as Black’s puppet in this situation, and therefore, Jones is not morally responsible. Therefore, since Black is symbolizing determinism, then does this case imply that humans act as puppets for determinism? This implication simply cannot be true, as we are not puppets for determinism, and instead are made up of laws of nature and previous events. Since the implication is false, then we can conclude that according to this argument, free will and determinism cannot co-exist.